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Abstract:  
In an aging society, it becomes more and more important to understand how aging 
affects decision making. Older adults have to face many situations that require 
consequential financial decisions. In the present study, we examined the effects of 
aging on decisions in two domains of uncertainty: risk and ambiguity. For this 
purpose, a group of young and older adults played a card game which was 
composed of risky and ambiguous conditions. In the risk condition, participants knew 
the probabilities to win or loose the game (i.e. full information), whereas in the 
ambiguous condition, these probabilities were unknown (thus, there was lack of 
information). When confronted with risky decisions, the behaviour of older and young 
adults (measured by the number of times participants chose a gamble instead of a 
sure amount of money) did not differ. In contrast, under ambiguity, there were 
significant age-effects in decision making: older people were less ambiguity-averse 
than young subjects. We conclude that there exist differences in uncertainty-
processing between young and older adults, and discuss possible explanations of 
these differences.  
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Introduction: 
The aging population 
Though it is widely recognized that all western societies are facing an aging 
population, most of the research on individual decision making relies on student 
populations (Henrich et al., 2010). While this reliance on student populations certainly 
reflects some effect of subject availability, it possibly is also a consequence of the 
common belief that decision-making abilities may decline with age (Peters et al., 
2000).  
Older adults have to make many consequential decisions. Choices in the domain of 
health care or financial decisions are only two examples of older people’s everyday 
life situations in which they need to decide carefully. Should they undergo a surgery 
with a certain risk but possibly high benefits, or rather not take the risk (or avoid 
making a decision (Mather, 2006))? Should they rather sell their house and move to 
an assisted living facility, or shouldn’t they? These and similar decisions not only 
have an immediate outcome, but possibly can also affect the individual’s future well-
being.  
The primary objective in this study was to elucidate the relationship between aging 
and decision making under financial uncertainty. Effectively, understanding how older 
adults make financial decisions is of great importance for social policy (Filer, Kenny, 
& Morton, 1993; Neugarten, 1974). Wealth tends to accumulate over the life course 
(Davies & Shorrocks, 2000; Jappelli & Pistaferri, 2000), and thus older adults have 
generally much more spending power than young adults do. At the same time, in 
countries devoid of compulsory voting, older individuals are more likely to vote than 
young people are, and thus they may have high political influence (Glenn & Grimes, 
1968; Strate, Parrish, Elder, & Ford, 1989). Due to shifts in the demographic structure 
of western countries, including long-term trends like increased longevity and short-
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term trends with long-term outcomes (cf. the baby-boom of the 1960’s), the 
proportion of older and retired people increases, and the concern to understand the 
differences between young and older adults increases. This is why we investigate the 
behavioural differences in financial decision making in the two age-groups. 
 
Uncertainty 
In rational-choice theories of financial decision making under uncertainty used in 
economics, the only factors that should influence uncertain choices are the judged 
probabilities of possible outcomes and the evaluation of those outcomes. But as by 
now largely proven, humans are not fully rational decision makers (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979; Krajbich, Armel, & Rangel, 2010), and confidence in estimated 
probabilities varies. In some choices, such as gambling in blackjack games, 
probabilities can be computed easily recurring to relative frequencies (by counting the 
number of played cards and similar strategies). On the other side, for situations like 
the outbreak of an epidemic, probabilities are based on conflicting or absent 
information and thus are difficult to compute. The first type of events is called risky in 
decision theory; the second type is called ambiguous. In subjective expected utility 
theory, only probabilities of outcomes should influence choice; confidence about 
probabilities in contrast, should not. But there is large experimental (and common 
knowledge) evidence that people are less willing to bet on ambiguous outcomes than 
on risky ones (Camerer & Weber, 1992).  
The difference between risk and ambiguity is well illustrated by the Ellsberg paradox 
(Ellsberg, 1961). Imagine an urn filled with 60 balls, half of the balls are red, and the 
other half are green. This is a risky treatment. Another urn also has 60 balls, but the 
distribution of red and green balls is not known to the player. This is the ambiguous 
treatment. A bet on a colour pays a fixed sum if the chosen colour matches the drawn 
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colour, and nothing otherwise. In situations of such choices, it seems quite intuitive 
for many people to bet on a green (or red) ball from a risky urn rather than to bet on a 
green (or red) ball from an ambiguous urn (Becker & Brownson, 1964; MacCrimmon, 
1968). If betting preferences were only determined by judged probabilities and their 
payoffs, this pattern wouldn’t happen. Following the theory, preferring the green draw 
from the risky urn implies that its subjective probability is higher Prisk(green) > 
Pambiguity(green). The same should be true for the red draw Prisk(red) > Pambiguity(red). 
But, and that’s the paradox, these inequalities and the problem that the probabilities 
of green and red must sum to 1 for each urn, imply: 
, 
a logically impossible assumption. Thus, choices can depend on the availability of 
relevant (and irrelevant) information (Frisch & Baron, 1988; for irrelevant information: 
Gaeth & Shanteau, 1984; Rabbitt, 1965) – and the paradox can be solved by 
allowing choices to depend not on objective, but on subjective probabilities of an 
event (Gilboa & Schmeidler, 1989; Schmeidler, 1989).  
 
Decision making and uncertainty in older adults 
As already mentioned, the aim of our experiment was to investigate the difference of 
uncertainty behaviour between young and older adults as currently no real 
consensus about the effects of aging on decision-making behaviour in an 
uncertainty-context exists. The few existing studies looking at decision making in 
older adults are inconclusive: some state that decision making abilities decline with 
age, while others disagree with this statement.  
In the deficit-perspective, e.g. Deakin et al. (Deakin, Aitken, Robbins, & Sahakian, 
2004) show that risk taking decreases with age and, more generally, that age is 
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related to poorer decision making (which can arise via multiple routes (Clark et al., 
2008)). Other authors (Chaubey, 1974; Dohmen et al., 2005; Hallahan, Faff, & 
McKenzie, 2004) agree with Deakin et al.’s first statement that the willingness to take 
risk is negatively related to age. The groups of Denburg et al. and Fein et al. provide 
supplementary evidence for Deakin et al.’s second statement (Denburg, Tranel, 
Bechara, & Damasio, 2001; Fein, McGillivray, & Finn, 2007). Following them, normal 
aging may compromise the ability to decide advantageously. 
In contrast to these studies, e.g. Dror et al. (Dror, Katona, & Mungur, 2000) refute 
Deakin et al’s first finding, and claim that older participants make risky decisions 
equivalent to those of young adults. Kovalchik et al.’s work (Kovalchik, Camerer, 
Grether, Plott, & Allman, 2005) disagrees with the second finding of Deakin et al.: for 
these authors, older adults’ overall decision making is similar to that of young adults. 
For the moment, there are two strongly related perspectives trying to explain these 
contradictory findings: a psychophysiological perspective, and a perspective focusing 
on cognitive, emotional and information-processing changes related to aging. 
From a psychophysiological perspective, one important fact is that the effects of 
ageing on the brain and, more generally, cognition are widespread and have multiple 
aetiologies (Cabeza et al., 2005). They have various effects on the physiological, 
molecular, morphological, and functional level. The cognitive effect that most often 
comes to mind associated with the ageing brain is memory decline (Small, Stern, 
Tang, & Mayeux, 1999), but as we’ll see, other cognitive abilities are affected as well. 
The main psychophysiological explanation of the contradictory findings seen above is 
heterogeneity in brain aging: according to Denburg et al. (Denburg, Recknor, 
Bechara, & Tranel, 2006), good decision making abilities among older adults may be 
a function of well-functioning somatic markers, whereas poor decision making 
abilities may arise from an abnormal somatic response generated in anticipation of a 
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future event. This effect is caused by interindividual differences in the aging process 
of a brain region of crucial importance to decision making, the frontal lobes (for an 
explanation of the link between decision making and the somatic marker hypothesis, 
see e.g. Tranel, Bechara, & Damasio, 2000). There is also evidence of ageing effects 
in other brain regions implicated in decision making: following Hampton and 
O'Doherty (2007), there is a specific network of brain regions implicated in encoding 
information relevant to decision making, and these regions can be affected by the 
aging process of the brain. Older adults counteract age-related decline of brain 
functioning through a reorganization of brain networks (Cabeza, 2002; Park & 
Reuter-Lorenz, 2009), but there are large interindividual variations in the extent of 
this reorganization. 
The other explanatory approach is the cognitive / emotional / information processing 
perspective, following which aging affects cognitive processes, emotion- and 
information processing. This perspective starts form the premission that a large part 
of older adults are still high functioning, with an active and intellectually challenging 
lifestyle. At the same time, even if older individuals are facing declines in cognitive 
and decision making abilities, this decline happens in general slowly and with a high 
inter-individual variance (M. Baltes & Montada, 1996; P. Baltes, Lindenberger, & 
Staudinger, 1995). According to Mata et al. (Mata, Schooler, & Rieskamp, 2007) 
older adults look up less information, take longer to process it and use simpler, less 
cognitively demanding strategies; but in general, young and older adults seem to be 
equally adapted decision makers. There are some additional possible explanations of 
these findings in the literature on aging, but none of them has been systematically 
investigated in the context of decision making under financial uncertainty. For 
example, it is possible that older adults simply pursue different goals than young 
adults do: the association between time left in life and chronological age ensures 
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age-related differences in goals and sense of future time plays an essential role in 
human motivation (Carstensen, 2006; Carstensen, Isaacowitz, & Charles, 1999). 
Decisions are strongly influenced by emotions (Coricelli, Dolan, & Sirigu, 2007) and 
like affective consequences can induce specific mechanisms of cognitive control of 
the choice processes (involving reinforcement or avoidance of the experienced 
behaviour), the emotional state of the decision maker, which in older adults tends to 
be more positive (Borges & Dutton, 1976), can influence his decision making abilities. 
Related to this is personality. As aging influences personality in some individuals, and 
as there are some personality traits – e.g. sensation seeking, cautiousness – 
influencing economic decision making (Borghans et al., 2008), heterogeneous 
changes in personality could also account for the contradictory statements. 
 Hypotheses 
Based on the large – but to some extent disputed – scientific evidence that risk-taking 
decreases with age (see above), we (1) hypothesize that older adults are less willing 
to take financial risks than young adults are. Also, we (2) hypothesize that differences 
in decision making under ambiguity between young and older adults exist. Lastly, we 
(3) hypothesize that young and older subjects gamble less in ambiguity conditions 
than in risk conditions, as decision-theory predicts.  
 
Methods 
Participants 
A total of 75 adults (51 young adults, 24 older adults) participated in the experiment. 
All of the young adults where students at the Universities of Mannheim or Heidelberg 
and were on average 25 years old (SD = 3.5). The older adults were healthy with an 
average age of 68 years (SD = 7.3, minimum age: 58 years). The majority of the 
older adults held a college or university degree and were retired. We recruited them 
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by word of mouth advertisement at an adult education centre. Thereby we wanted to 
generate a group of participants with a similar level of education and a cognitively 
active lifestyle and, as our task was computer-based, to ensure that the older adults 
were familiar with the use of a computer mouse.  
Participants 
 Young Older 
Number 51 24 
Male 20 12 
Female 31 12 
Age (SD) 25 (3.5) 68 (7.3) 
Years of education* (SD) 12.64 (1.32) 12.22 (1.38) 
*until graduation from school 
 
Procedures 
The experiment took place at the Collaborative Research Center 504 Lab (SFB-504) 
of the University of Mannheim (young participants) and at the Alfred Weber Institute 
Lab (AWI-Lab) of Heidelberg University (young and older participants).  
Participants were seated in computer-equipped cubicles devoid of visual access to 
other participants. An experimenter explained the modus operandi of the study. All 
participants received the same instructions. Participants first had to fill in a general 
questionnaire asking questions on their educational level, health status, and related 
questions. Subsequently, the experimental task by which we examined behaviour 
under uncertainty started. The task consisted of a card game similar to the card-deck 
treatment used by Hsu et al. (2005). In this task, subjects had to make continuous 
choices between a gamble and sure amount of money. In half of the trials, 
participants were faced with risky decisions (i.e. the probabilities of winning were 
known), and in half of the trials, they were faced with ambiguous decisions (i.e. the 
probabilities of winning the gamble were unknown). Risky and ambiguous gambles 
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alternated. In total, subjects had to make 48 decisions (24 risky and 24 ambiguous), 
in which card distribution (respectively the total number of cards) and outcome 
varied. We used the same probability distribution as Hsu et al. (2005). The total 
number of cards in the game ranged between 5 and 40, and outcome between 6 and 
20 ECU. 
We used two different graphical user interfaces (GUI) to present the game to the 
participants. First, the game was programmed in ZTree and used with the student 
population (n = 35). In a subsequent pretest with older adults, we observed massive 
difficulties using the game (due to factors like button size and menu alignment). This 
is the reason why we decided to change the GUI to C# instead of ZTree and to 
slightly adapt the appearance of the game to ensure that it was as easy as possible 
to manipulate, even for subjects not that familiar with the use of a computer interface. 
An additional student group (n = 16) played the C#-game to test the comparability of 
the student group with the elderly group. As there was no significant difference in 
behaviour between students playing the ZTree-game and playing the C#-game (2-
sided t-test for independent groups; risk: t(49) = .37, p = .74; ambiguity: t(49) = -1.731, p 
= .09), we pooled both groups for data analysis.a 
The aim of the game was to observe player’s behaviour under both types of 
uncertainty. Subjects were allowed as much time as they needed to make their 
choices. Responses were made by pressing on the corresponding option on the 
screen. Subjects had the possibility to decide between three options: the sure payoff 
that paid a certain positive amount of money or a bet on either side of a binary choice 
gamble that carried some uncertainty of paying either a positive sum or zero.  
Overall, the task lasted for 15 minutes, and young and old adults took the same time 
to perform the task. Participants received a show-up fee of € 3. In addition, they were 
                                                 
a As the p-value for ambiguity could be considered as marginally significant, we tested whether the results still 
hold if we only use the students that played with the C# interface. We find that our results still hold.  
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paid depending on their choices. On average, their total gain in the experimental 
session was € 7.80 (SD = 0.50).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Screens presented to the subjects. Left screen: choice between an ambiguous gamble and a 
sure amount of money. Right screen: choice between a risky gamble and a sure amount of 
money. 
 
Timeline of the game. 
 
 
Results 
Statistical methods 
Risk behaviour was measured by the quantity of gambles subjects took instead of a 
sure amount of money, and was considered as a metric variable ranging from 0 (no 
gamble chosen at all) to 24 (always chosen the gamble instead of the sure payoff). 
Ambiguity behaviour was measured, mutatis mutandis, the same way. A search for 
outliers revealed no results. To test for age effects in risk behaviour (hypothesis 1), 
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we used a one-tailed t-test, because we expected behaviour to tend in the direction 
of more risky choices in young adults. Hypothesis 2, the existence of age effects in 
ambiguity behaviour, was not directed, and we used a two-tailed t-test. To investigate 
our third hypothesis, that subjects are less prone to play ambiguous gambles than 
risky gambles, we used again one-tailed t-tests. 
Analysis 
T-tests for independent groups showed that there is no significant difference in 
decision-making under risk in the two age groups (one-tailed t-test: t(73) = 0.18, p = 
0.43). Young and older adults play the same amount of risky gambles in the game 
(average number of risky gambles taken by older participants: 16.0, SD = 5.7; by 
young participants: 15.7, SD = 5.6). In contrast, there is a significant difference in 
decision-making under ambiguity between older and young people (two-tailed t-test: 
t(73) = 2.19, p = 0.03). Older adults are more prone to play ambiguous gambles than 
young adults are (average number of ambiguous gambles taken by older 
participants: 17.6, SD = 5.5; by young participants: 14.2, SD = 6.6). 
 
Results 1 
Gamble Age-group Mean SD t-test t-value (73) p
Young 15.7 5.6
Risk 
Older 16.0 5.7
one-tailed 0.18 0.43
Young 14.2 6.6
Ambiguity 
Older 17.6 5.5
two-tailed 2.19 0.03
T-tests for paired groups showed that young participants play significantly more risky 
than ambiguous gambles (one-tailed t-test; t(50) = 1.75, p = 0.04). This is not the case 
in older participants: older adults play more ambiguous than risky gambles, but with 
only marginal significance (one-tailed t-test; t(23) = 1.30, p = 0.10). 
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Results 2 
Age-group Gamble Mean SD t-test t-value (df) p
Risk 15.7 5.6
Young 
Ambiguity 14.2 6.6
one-tailed 1.75 (50) 0.04
Risk 16.0 5.7
Older 
Ambiguity 17.6 5.5
one-tailed 1.30 (23) 0.10
 
Discussion 
The aim of our study was to investigate the effects of aging on decision making under 
financial uncertainty. We hypothesized that (1) older adults are less willing to take 
financial risks than young adults are, (2) ambiguity behaviour changes with age, (3) 
young and older subjects gamble less in ambiguity conditions than in risk conditions. 
The study only partially confirms our hypotheses, as older adults seem to be equally 
willing to take risks as young adults are (refuting hypothesis 1), ambiguity behaviour 
effectively differs with age (confirming hypothesis 2), and young subjects do gamble 
less in ambiguous conditions than in risky conditions, but older adults show no 
significant difference between risk and ambiguity behaviour (partially confirming 
hypothesis 3). 
Following our first hypothesis, older adults should have a higher risk aversion than 
young adults in the risky condition. This is however not the case. Although we didn’t 
expect that there is no difference in risk behaviour, this result is not surprising. We 
were aware that the hypothesis of a higher risk aversion in older adults is to some 
extend debated, as shown by Dror et al. (2000). Effectively, we used a subject pool 
quite similar to the one of Dror et al., as all our older participants were healthy and 
highly active. Overall, older adults are very heterogeneous in their cognitive abilities, 
and activity might preserve cognitive ability with aging. This could explain why we did 
not find any differences in risky decisions between young and older adults. We have 
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to take into account that our results might apply only to a specific, cognitively active 
group of older adults, and not to the entire group of older people. 
Concerning ambiguity, the study showed that older adults gamble more than young 
adults in ambiguous conditions. This result seemed prima facie counterintuitive to us; 
however there are some factors that can explain this behaviour.  
The first factor that could explain our result is the positivity effect (Mather & 
Carstensen, 2005), following which older adults are more optimistic than young 
adults (Borges & Dutton, 1976; Lennings, 2000). Older adults focus more on 
regulating emotion than young adults do, and this improves their overall emotional 
experience. Some authors suggest that in the aging process, an increased focus on 
emotion regulation influences attention and memory (e.g. Mather, 2004). In tasks 
focusing on attention, older adults respond faster if the task is associated with 
positive emotions than when it is associated with negative emotions (Mather and 
Carstensen, 2003). While brain activation related to emotion salience is the same for 
positive and negative emotions in young adults, it is higher for positive than for 
negative emotions in older adults (Mather et al., 2004). This positivity effect of 
emotions is also salient when it comes to memory: older adults are likely to show a 
memory distortion that prefers chosen options over rejected options (Mather and 
Johnson, 2000). This implies that older adults sometimes are more likely to 
repeatedly choose the same options because their memories are biased in favour of 
positive outcomes of their past choices. The tendency to focus on positive emotions 
leads to changes in decision making abilities. It is well known that emotions have 
effects on economic decision making (Lerner, Small, & Loewenstein, 2004), and in 
particular positive affect can improve decision making (Isen, 2001). In our case, this 
positivity effect can influence decision behaviour under ambiguity in two different 
ways. First, it signifies that older adults’ memories of gains are more prominent than 
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those of losses, and decisions based on the memory of gains in ambiguity decisions 
can lead to a lower level of ambiguity aversion. The other way the positivity effect can 
influence ambiguous decisions is by the overall emotional state of the individual; 
mood influences loss aversion (Camerer, 2005), which is strongly related to 
ambiguity aversion. 
A second explanation for the age difference in behaviour is given by Mata et al. 
(2007). In their study, they found a difference in strategies used by young and older 
adults to make a decision: older adults look up less information and take more time to 
process it, but overall decision making of older and young adults seems to be 
equivalent. If we apply this to the fact that ambiguity is a condition with less 
information available than risk, one could think that ambiguous decisions are more 
suitable to older adults.  
Another factor that can play a role in our findings simply is experience. In fact, older 
adults had a lifetime to decide and develop strategies for decisions under ambiguity. 
They can retrieve information from a memory that young adults are just beginning to 
develop. One survey of bank managers for example revealed that older managers’ 
business decisions were more aggressive than the decisions of younger managers 
(Brouthers, Brouthers, and Werner, 2000), and different studies found that risky 
investments increased until a certain moment in life (Riley and Chow, 1992; Schooley  
and Worden, 1999, Jianakoplos  and Bernasek, 1998).  
Lastly, one could argue that older adults pursue different goals than young adults. 
Effectively, older adults are more interested in social goals (Mather, 2006) and 
monetary rewards are less of an incentive to them. We have to take into account the 
fact that winning an amount of around 8€ does not represent a large sum for 
someone who has earned money all his life and gets a monthly retirement annuity. 
The case is different for students who mostly haven’t had the opportunity to 
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accumulate much wealth during their life course so far and therefore have a different 
reference point. But, many studies (e.g. Camerer & Thaler, 1995; Cameron, 1999; 
Hoffman, McCabe, & Smith, 1996) show that as long as participants can earn money 
in an experiment, the height of the stakes does not (or only little) influence behaviour. 
The third hypothesis stated that young and older subjects gamble less in ambiguity 
conditions than in risk conditions. Our results confirmed this hypothesis for young, but 
not for older adults: young adults behave as theory predicts, whereas older adults do 
not show a statistically significant difference between risk and ambiguity decisions. 
One possible explanation for this finding could be the positivity effect mentioned 
above. Following the positivity effect, older adults have a memory distortion in favour 
of previous choices. This leads them to choose coherently with previous decisions, 
leading to fewer switches in strategies. This low level of strategy changes – in a 
game in which the ambiguous and risky conditions alternated – could also explain the 
absence of significant behavioural differences in older adults.  
In conclusion, we can say that older adult’s decision-making behaviour effectively 
differs from that of younger adults. In risky situations, they behave such as young 
adults would behave, and in ambiguous situations, they are less ambiguity averse. 
We have shown that there are different possible explanations for our results, and 
further work will be needed to understand the causes of our findings. 
On a more practical level, our findings can have implications for older adults’ 
everyday life. In our societies, older adults represent a growing part of the population, 
and a part of the population that will work until a higher age, thus making financial 
decisions at a higher age. Employers, as well as financial institutions and politicians 
should be aware that older adult’s decision making behaviour changes, and should 
adapt to this situation. At the same time, when older adults are aware that their 
decision making changes, it can help them to cope with decision situations that are 
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designed from and for younger adults. Thus, understanding age differences in 
decision-making behaviour can help older people to stay adapted decision makers, 
and thereby improve their overall wellbeing. It can also help employers to decide 
which tasks are well suited for older employees and which are not.  
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